Sudan’s history is marked by a considerable number of plots and coups d’état. Even though each of them was preceded by social and political unrest that created conducive conditions for the military to take power, the coup that ousted Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 seemed to be different. Massive protests for the country’s economic conditions and against Islamist policies had gone on for months. Extensive corruption networks, headed by big men in the political and military elite, were at the center of the mass protests. Requests for democracy were vocal and widespread: even though it was ultimately the military, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to depose al-Bashir, civil society seemed strong and well positioned to obtain at least some achievements.
A few days after the coup, a transitional government was formed with civilian participation, but the military kept control of the Sovereign Council tasked with guiding the transition towards elections. The transitional government was headed by Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok and included representatives of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of political movements and civil society organizations opposing al-Bashir’s regime and asking for democratic transition.
Hamdok found itself facing a daunting task: responding to civil society’s requests and expectations around the improvement of the country’s economic situation, secularizing its society and politics and transitioning the country to democracy, while keeping a working relation with a military backed by Islamist movements and largely in control of the country’s economic nodes and natural resources. With the respectability of an expert economist and politician and the international credibility derived from having occupied prominent positions at the African Development Bank and at the UN Economic Commission for Africa, Hamdok was a reassuring figure both internally and to external interlocutors. He managed to sign a peace agreement with most of Darfuri rebel groups (who were consequently co-opted into the government) and to resume amicable relations with Western donors, including the World Bank and the US. At the same time, however, he struggled to advance the political reforms expected by Sudanese citizens.
While mass protests continued in the country over the persistent economic crisis aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, the delay in the democratic transition process, and the failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of the violent crackdown on the 2018-9 protesters, tensions between the civilian and military components of the transitional government arose. Multiple issues were at stake: the security sector reform; the handing over of Omar al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court; civilian control of the post-revolutionary political process, and of the police and intelligence forces.
An attempted coup on 21 September as well as the discovery of a terrorist cell in Khartoum contributed to extending and deepening this rift across society, too. Just days before the 25 October military coup, pro-military protestors also took to the streets to call for the army to take power back, accusing Hamdok, his cabinet, and the FFC of a power grab while stalling the transition.
Amidst these looming tensions, another coup was staged. On 25 October, General al-Burhan ousted Prime Minister Hamdok, declared a state of emergency, and dissolved the joint civilian and military transitional government. Hamdok was placed under house arrest and many other members of the government were detained by the military, while protests were violently cracked down causing over 40 victims.
The international community reacted promptly: the UN secretary, the African Union, and the World Bank condemned the coup ad suspended the country. The US, the World Bank, and the EU also withdrew financial assistance from Sudan for over US$4 billion directed to various assistance programs. The Arab league and several other national governments joined in condemnation.
Perhaps also as a response to this sudden international isolation, General al-Burhan, heading the military junta, sought an agreement with Hamdok, which they signed on 21 November. Though the agreement keeps some of the earlier commitments, such as the creation of a unified national army and the organization of elections in July 2023, it was met with great resistance from most of the societal and political forces that were demanding a transition to democracy. Twelve ministers resigned in sign of protest for the exclusion of the FFC from the negotiation; while several other political forces also rejected the agreement as mass protests ensued.
Though Hamdok claims to have complete freedom to form his cabinet, many see the agreement as legitimizing the 25 October coup and normalizing its outcome: just another coup in Sudan, reaffirming that power in the country is firmly in the hands of the military and that civilian governments can only function if allowed by the military. Hamdok’s reinstatement definitely guarantees a degree of economic and political stability to the country at a time when it is in dire need of both: prices of basic commodities have skyrocketed in the last year, with inflation nearly out of control, while the country is facing serious geopolitical tensions with neighbouring Ethiopia over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as well as other border disputes. These geopolitical tensions also seem to have played a role in the staging of the coup, with allegation of al-Burhan being supported by al-Sisi’s government in Egypt as an ally against Ethiopia over the GERD dispute.
Nevertheless, the issues at stake for Sudan’s citizens go well beyond Hamdok’s credibility and capacity of managing these multiple crises: it is about the structural role of the military and that of Islam in Sudanese politics and society. On the one hand, the Sudanese military is not a unitary body. Omar al-Bashir was an active sponsor of local militias to fight his multiple civil wars: one of these, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) known as the janjaweed and active in Darfur under the leadership of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo aka Hemedti, has become particularly powerful due to the support received in the framework of the European Union’s policies to counter illegal migrations from the Horn of Africa. Hemedti, who is currently the Vice President of the Sovereign Council, was not at the forefront of the 25 October coup and has some divergences with al-Burhan. However, he holds a big stake in the outcome of the coup, as he repeatedly voiced his disagreement about the dismantling of the RSF foreseen by the former transitional government and reaffirmed in the agreement signed on 21 November. Based on a report by the Enough Project, Hemedti established an almost complete control over Darfuri gold reserves through the RSF and used it to maintain a large patronage network .
On the other hand, the agreement signed between al-Burhan and Hamdok foresees the reintegration of all political forces in the political arena, with the only exception of the Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP). This includes the two Islamist groups, Popular Congress Party and Reform Now Party, born out of successive splits of the NCP yet still including close allies of the former regime and military. This represents another alarming development for those who hoped for a real transition: not only because the inclusion of these movements challenges the demands for secularization and the abolition of sharia law, but also because it confirms that Sudanese politics will likely remain dominated by the same contested figures of the past regime – including Hemedti.
